Fern K.  Bader v. William A. Bader : Brief of Appellant by unknown
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (cases filed before 1965)
1967
Fern K. Bader v. William A. Bader : Brief of
Appellant
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.Sumner J. Hatch & L. E. Richardson; Attorneys for Defendant-
Appellant.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (cases filed before 1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Bader v. Bader, No. 10691 (1967).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/4892
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH lr 
FERN K. BADER, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
·ry ci: UTAH 
Case No. vs. 
10691 
WJJLLIAM A. BAnER, 
Defend01nt-Appellant. 
BRIE,F OF APPELLANT 
Appeal from the Judgment of the Third District Court 
for Salt Lake County 
Hon. A. H. Ellett, Judge 
SUMNER J. HATCH & 
L. E. RlCHARDSON 
516 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for 
Def endam,t-Appellant 
HOWARD E. BAYSINGER 
Walker Bank Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorney for D 
Plaintiff-Respondent E I L E 
SEP?, ·1 1966 
TABLE OF CONTEW1'S 
Page 
Statement of the Nature of the Case ..... .............................. 1 
Disposition in Lower Court.................. . ...................................... 2 
Relief Sought from the Court ..... .............. ............... ................. 2 
Statement of Material Facts...................................... ................. 2 
Point on Appeal 
Point: That the Award of the Trial Court Is Uujust 
and Unreasonable Considering the Circumstances of the 
Parties ...................................................................................... . 
Argument ........................................................................................ . 
Conclusion ....................................................... . 




Anderson v. Anderson, 110 Utah 300, 172 P2d 132, 136..... 7 
Dahlberg v. Dahlberg, 77 Utah 157, 162, 292 P 214............. 7 
Hendricks v. Hendricks, !ll Utah 553, 63 P2d 277. . .. 6, 7 
Porter v. Porter, 109 Utah 444, 166 P2d 516.. 6 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
1·'1,:l{X K. BADER, 




\\' LLLJ A~l A. BADER, 
Def e11da11t-Appella11 t. 
This ease i::; an action l'or <liYoree brought again::;t 
the appellant, \Yilliarn .\. Had(•r, by tlw l'<'t'pondPnt, 
F'ern K. BadPr. 
2 
DISPOSI'rION IN 1'H1£ LOWEH COURT 
'L'he Third Di::;trict Court, Hon. A. H. Ellett presid-
ing, granted the respondent an interlocutory decree of 
divorce, awarded her the custody of two minor children 
subject to visitation privileges, provided for the award 
of property to the parties, provided for child ::,;upport, 
and awarded her two lump sums as satisfaction of at-
torney fees, arrearage in temporary support, and in lieu 
of alimony. 
RELIEF SOUGHT FROM TH1£ COURT 
That the $935.13 held by the clerk of the lower 
Jourt be released to the appellant. 'L'hat the order to 
pay the respondent $1456.00, payable.at the rate of $40.00 
per month commencing on the 1st day of January, 196'7, 
he voidt~d. 'L'hat the child support be reduced from $200.00 
per month to $150.00 per month, and for such other re-
lid as may appear equitable and just. 
S'L'A'l'1'~1U<:NT OF MATI~RlAL FAC'L'S 
'l'lw parties were married on December 6, 1958, and 
had two children during the marriage .The responch'nt 
had thn~e children by a previous marriage, the oldest 
married and became self-supporting approximately a 
year and half after this marriage was consummated. 
(Tr. :32, 53) The other two children by the former hus-
band were solely supported by the appellant during 
thn~e years of tla~ marriage period, this being the tinw 
lwh\"!'<'n which the respondent stopped working and tlw 
3 
time when social security becanw payable due to the 
death of fatlwr of the childnm by the former marriage 
\'l'r. 53, M). 
At the time of entry of the interlocutory decree, the 
parties owed to a credit union, bank, finance company, 
;loctors, etc., the sum of $5,195.00. ('I'r. 39) 
'l'he property was distributed between the parties 
\\·ith the appl'llant receiving a 19Gl Ifa.mbler station 
wagon, a 28-foot traih~r house, two boats and motors, a 
shotgun, three rifles, and the equity in a house. ( 'l'r. 
:)8 & 39) The value of this property not including the 
shotgun and rifles was routinely estimated at approxi-
mately $2,7G5.00 ( 'l'r. 69, 86) ; however, with the current 
market for used personal property, and particularly in 
the case of the estimated $1,500.00 equity in the homw 
(Tr. ;33 & 56) after considering the expenses involved 
in a sale, it is extremely doubtful that anywhere nPar 
this sum could be realized. 
'l'he respondent received all furniture and fixhtrt-s, 
a -±-grave burial plot including two vaults and head-
:itones, and a 19GO Chevrolet with the provision that 
she assm11e the responsibility for the $950.00 remaining 
due thereon. 'l'he respondent was awarded $200.00 per 
month child support and $935.13 (the proceeds of income 
·tax n~fund checks) in lieu of alimony until January of 
1967 ('I'r. 77, 78). She was also awarded a further lump 
sum of $1,-!56.00 payable at the rate of $40.00 per month 
:·omrnenemg on th<~ 1st day of January, 1967. 'l'his sum 
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,,·as broken down as $300.00 attorney fees, $196.27 ar-
~·earage on temporary support, and $959.73 in lieu of 
alimony. ('l'r. 38 and 39). 
'l'lte appellant was re<1uired to assume and discharge 
lebts of the parties in the amount of $-!,2-H.l.OO. (Tr. 39) 
Ap1Jellant 's average "take-J10me" pay from his pri-
mar.v job is $-!35.00 per month, ('l'r. 50) ( 'l'he average 
of $4-71.40 as outlined on page 3-! of the transcript is in-
flatt•d by wages paid 2 .January 19GG for work during 
DP<'<·nilwr, 19G5), plus $9-!.00 per month from a part-time 
joh, plus $-!0.00 per month from the Veterans Admin-
istration due to a disability ('l'r. 34), for a total average 
of $5li9.00 per month. Out of this smn he is initially re-
1nired to pay in fixed amounts the $200.00 child support 
(Tr. 35), $120.00 house payment (Tr. 85), $65.00 to a 
·n·dit union as payment on $3,500.00 of the debts he is 
requirP<l to discharge ('l'r. 34), plus $80.00 additional 
.·hild snpport for children of a previous marriage ('l'r. 
/:l). A matlu·matical computation reveals that he has 
l<>f't th<• :-:um of $10-t.OO per month without considering 
nn~· pay11H·nt:-: mi the additional $745.00 in debts he was 
·hnrg<>d to assm1ie. ('l'r. 39') 
During this same period, respondent will receive 
.~:200.00 p<'l' month support money for the children of 
tltis matTiag<' ('l'r. 39), $194.00 per month from social 
:-:<·eurit~· for children of lter previous marriage ('l'r. 5~)) 
and tlt<· c•qnivalent of apprnximately $155.00 per month 
l'rn111 th<• lmnp sum in lieu of alimony ($935.l:) spn·ad 
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OY('.J' six lllonths) ('rr. :l8), for a total ~um of $;)30.00 pn 
mouth. Nhe is of co1ns1· n~quin~tl to a::;sunw n•sponsi-
hility under tlie <lecn~e !"or $950.00 due on the (.;hevroll·t 
automohile plus a tokl~ll n•ut 11a)·rn<'nt of $/J.00 (Tr. ;3s). 
Co1mne11cing .January 1, HJG7, the appdlant is in a 
.;o11wwlmt lwtt<~r position. \\'ith the cessation of $KU.OO 
~'.liil<l support for children hy his pn~viou:oo rnaniag1· (Tr. 
77) and tlw comw0ncernent of the $+0.00 per rnon th 
paym<_•nt of the $1,45G.00 lump sum awarded tlw respon· 
rlPnt ('l'r. :Jt_-; and 39) he i::> left with the rnunificient surn 
:lf $1+-t..OO per month after fixl~d ohligations, ancl thi8 
tJnl:- if lw continue:'" to work at the rate of 5G hours p<·r 
1H'l'k. (Tr. ti8) If he should work at \\·hat is heuHning 
tlH· ahov<• avc·rag«~ rate of -to hours per week, he would 
han• remaining a total of $50.00 per rnoHth. 
At the sauw time, the r<~spondent would b1~ n•<·Pi Ying· 
.H:l-t.00 a month without working. She has worked in the 
pa::>t as a telephone company supervisor at an c•xcellent 
salary. (Tr. 5±) But as she states (Tr. G~) is not "ac-
tively attempting" to get f~mploymen t though she does 
have an application in with the teh~phone company. 
POINT ON. APPEAL 
THAT THE AWARD OF THE TRIAL COURT IS 
UNJUST AND UNREASONABLE CONSIDERING 
THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE PARTIES. 
6 
From the facts outlined above, it appears obvious 
that the appellant is being placed in an almost untenable 
position if he discharges his obligations and attempts 
to maintain evt>n a minimum standard of living on the 
amounts left therefor. That he should be forced to such 
extreme circumstances even while working 56 hours per 
1 
week is considered so unreasonable and unjust as to 
strain the conscience. 
At the same time, the respondent has had two chil-
dn~n by a former marriage supported by the appellant 
for at least three years of this marriage; she has had 1 
all property she brought to the marriage, plus a share of 
that accumulated, returned to her, and more than gen-
Prous provision for the support of the children of this 1 
marriage has been provided. Thus, in view of the cir-
<·.nmstances of the appellant, it would appear that some 
effort on her part to contribute to her own and her 
family's support, would be appropriate. 
rrhe law on the subject appears clear -
Amount of alimony is measured by wife's 
needs and requirements, considering her station 
in life, and upon husband's ability to pay. Hen-
rli-icks v. Hendricks, 91 Utah 553, 63 P.2d 277, 
followed in Porter v. Porter, 109 Utah 444, 16<i 
P.2d 516. 
and while-
If the amount of the award is reasonable and 
7 
not excessive under the facts and ei rcmnstanePs 
of the particular case; it will not be distmbe<l. 
Anderson v. Anderson, 110 Utah 300, 172 P.2<1 
132, 136. 
Still in all fairness the -
Decree as to alimony must be <letenni1wd 
upon the facts, conditions, and circumstances of 
parties in each partieular case, and if, upon ex-
amination of record, Supreme Court holds that 
award of trial court is im•quitable and unjust, it 
should direct such deeree as it finds to be ,just and 
equitable. Hendricks v. Hendricks, supra. 
And as further amplified -
The kind of division or the amount of an 
allowance to be made is dependent upon the facts, 
circumstances of each partieular ease, and, if 
upon a consideration of them tlw division or al-
lowance as made by the court below is im'llUi-
table or unjust, the Supreme Court will interf erP, 
even though court below did not abuse its discn'-
tion, it being sufficient that court below ern•d in 
making the division or allowance, and that equity 
and justice require an interference and a modifi-
cation thereof. The question thus is as to whethPr 
on the facts found the division and allowaneP 
were equitable and just. Da·hllJcrg v. DahllJPrg, 
77 Utah 157, 162, 292 P. 21-t 
CONCLUSION 
It is our contention that under the facts of this 
ease, and in view of the situation of the parties, that the 
division or t11e property, alloeation of r<>sponsibilil v for 
8 
d<'hb a('quin•d during tlt1~ warriag-P, altlo1111t of d1ild 
~npport, and the award of 11tlllp ~;u111:' i11 lit~n of alimo11y 
knn•s the appellant in a position :'o im·quitable and 
1111,just as to require tliP Suprenw Court in the inkn•st 
of fairnPss and ju~ti('e, and in the PXPl'<'ise of its clear 
power in sueh ('ases, to rnodif~- tl11• de1·ree of the lmn_•r 
conrt and give relief a:-; prayPd for herein. 
L. g_ RICHARDSON 
